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Abstract
On the basis of a brief reconstruction of the causes and impacts of the euro crisis, this 
paper explores, counterfactually and hypothetically, whether the new euro regime, in-
sisting on fiscal austerity and supply-side reforms, could have prevented the rise of the 
crisis or is able to deal with its disastrous economic and social impact. A comparison 
with the likely impact of transfer-based Keynesian reflation suggests that, in both cases, 
economic success is uncertain, while both approaches are likely to produce severely 
negative side-effects. In light of such dismal policy choices, attempts to politicize Euro-
pean election campaigns are more likely to provoke unmanageable policy conflict than 
to overcome the input-oriented, democratic deficit of European economic governance.
Zusammenfassung
Das Papier analysiert die Ursachen der Eurokrise und fragt dann, kontrafaktisch und 
hypothetisch, ob das neue, auf fiskalische Konsolidierung und strukturelle Reformen 
setzende Euro-Regime die Krise hätte vermeiden können oder jetzt geeignet wäre, de-
ren desaströse ökonomische und soziale Folgen zu überwinden. Ein Vergleich mit der 
Alternative einer keynesianischen Politik der transfergestützten fiskalischen Reflation 
zeigt, dass in beiden Fällen der ökonomische Erfolg ungewiss bleibt, aber auf jeden Fall 
mit gravierenden negativen Nebenwirkungen zu rechnen ist. Angesichts derart uner-
freulicher Politikoptionen würde der Versuch einer Politisierung der Wahlen zum Eu-
ropäischen Parlament eher kaum zu bewältigende Richtungs- und Verteilungskonflikte 
provozieren, als zu einer Überwindung des europäischen Demokratiedefizits beitragen.
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Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area
1 Introduction
In spite of academic and political assertions of a “European democratic deficit,” and 
in spite of a steadily decreasing voter participation in elections of the European Parlia-
ment, 57 percent of all Europeans said that they “tended to trust the European Union” 
in September 2007 – that is, before the onset of the present crises. By the end of 2012, 
however, responses to the same Eurobarometer question indicated that trust had fallen 
to 33 percent, and distrust of the EU had risen from 32 to 57 percent (Zalc 2013; see 
also Roth/Novak-Lehmann/Otter 2013). But if trust was high in 2007, and if it declined 
steeply in the absence of any obvious changes in the democratic qualities of European 
governing institutions, that suggests that the understanding of “trust” that is captured 
in Eurobarometer surveys differs from the criteria implied in academic and political 
discussions of the democratic deficit. This difference is reflected in the conceptual dis-
tinction between the output-oriented and the input-oriented dimension of political 
legitimacy (Scharpf 1970, 1999) – between Lincoln’s “government for the people” and 
“by the people” or between “responsible” and “responsive” government (Mair 2009).
In normative political theory, the status of output-oriented legitimacy is primordial. 
The coercive powers of government are needed to attain purposes, and to deal with 
problems that are beyond the reach of voluntary cooperation in civil society and of 
market interactions. At the same time, however, these powers can be abused by oppres-
sive, predatory, vindictive or simply incompetent governors. Hence the legitimacy of 
government itself is in question if it fails to serve the common good of the community 
and to comply with its basic norms and standards of justice. While output-oriented 
criteria apply to the performance of government across the board, the input-orient-
ed norm of democratic self-government is more specific. Ideally, government action 
should arise from the equal participation of citizens in public interest-oriented debates 
conducted in a common public space. In representative democracies, that implies that 
governors should be responsive not only to these debates but also to the preferences and 
interests of all members of their constituency. To ensure responsiveness, democratic 
The paper was written during my stay, from April to July 2013, at the Kollegforschergruppe “The 
Transformative Power of Europe” at the Free University of Berlin. I am grateful to Tanja Börzel and 
Thomas Risse for the invitation and the opportunity to participate in the lively and fascinating dis-
cussions among KFG fellows. A draft of the paper benefited from their critical examination in a KFG 
seminar and in particular from the helpful comments by Thomas Risse. At the MPIfG, my research 
for the paper has benefited greatly from ongoing discussions with Martin Höpner and the competent 
assistance of Anna Berger. A shorter version of the paper will appear in Olaf Cramme/Sara B. Hobolt 
(eds.), Democratic Politics in a European Union under Stress. Oxford University Press (2014).
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political systems depend on a variety of institutional arrangements, the most important 
of which is the dependence of governors on the outcomes of free, equal, periodic, and 
competitive elections. 
Critiques of a European democratic deficit have focused mainly on input-oriented de-
ficiencies of EU political processes and institutions. But as European legislation was 
implemented and enforced by member-state institutions, citizens were not directly con-
fronted with the coercive power of EU government. At the same time, member-state 
governments were visibly involved in EU policy making, and voters could and have used 
their electoral powers to hold their own governments accountable for the exercise of 
all governing powers, regardless of their origin at national or European levels. Because 
of this input-oriented “legitimacy intermediation” (Scharpf 2012), discussions of the 
EU’s democratic deficit have agitated mainly academic specialists and idealistic politi-
cians, but they have not achieved high political salience. It seems plausible, therefore, 
to interpret the generally high level of public “trust” in the EU primarily as an indica-
tor of output-oriented legitimacy – and of citizens’ “benign neglect” of input-oriented 
deficiencies at the European level. 
In the meantime, however, things have changed. European economies were badly hit 
by the international financial and economic crises triggered by the collapse of Lehman 
Bros. in the fall of 2008. Subsequently, some member states of the European Monetary 
Union were threatened by sovereign insolvency – which was interpreted as a euro cri-
sis. In the effort to “save the euro at any cost,” European authorities – the Council, the 
Commission, the European Central Bank and the “Troika” – have then deeply inter-
vened in the lives of millions of citizens and in the economic, social and institutional 
fabrics of some EMU member states. In the output-dimension, these efforts have so 
far not succeeded in halting economic decline and the rise of mass unemployment in 
those states. In the process, however, they have also disabled input-oriented democratic 
policy choices at the national level, or have confronted national parliaments with re-
quirements they could not reject without disavowing the commitment to European 
integration. In short, the euro crisis and the policies attempting to cope with it have 
destroyed the preconditions of “legitimacy intermediation” as the dramatic visibility, 
political salience, and direct effects of exercises of European governing authority have 
put an end to the permissive consensus and benign neglect that long characterized citi-
zens’ attitudes toward the EU.
As a consequence, the European polity is now confronted not only with a significant 
decline of the output-oriented political support on which it could rely before the onset 
of the present crisis, but also with the much increased political salience of its input-
oriented democratic deficit – which has in fact intensified in the course of euro-rescue 
policies. Worse yet, I will argue, the euro crisis has created a fundamental legitimacy 
dilemma: if the Monetary Union is to be maintained, the policies required to contain 
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the crisis must be of a nature and have consequences that will counteract all efforts 
to achieve input-oriented political legitimacy for institutions and policy choices at the 
European level. 
But in order to establish the plausibility of these arguments, it is first necessary to ex-
amine the underlying structural causes of the steep decline of output legitimacy and the 
constraints of improving the problem-solving effectiveness of the Monetary Union be-
fore going on to discuss their implications for potential responses to the input-oriented 
deficiencies of European legitimacy. In discussing the performance of the Monetary 
Union, I will address the role of the original EMU regime in causing the euro crisis and 
shaping initial policy responses, as well as the new euro regime that has been set up to 
correct the effects of the crisis and to prevent its re-occurrence, and I will try to antici-
pate the problem-solving effectiveness of the present euro-governance regime.
2 Performance of the original euro regime
The structural deficiencies of the original EMU regime and their causal effect on the 
euro crisis are by now reasonably well understood (Scharpf 2011; De Grauwe 2012; 
Notre Europe 2012): by joining the Monetary Union, member states lost both the need 
to respect a balance-of-payments constraint and the capacity to respond to problems 
of inflation and unemployment through the macroeconomic management of aggregate 
domestic demand. And though fiscal competences remained at national levels, their 
use for macroeconomic purposes was asymmetrically constrained by the Stability Pact 
and by the fact that governments could no longer issue bonds in their own currency. 
In addition, member states also lost the capacity of a national central bank to act as 
lender of last resort in case of a state liquidity crisis. Exchange-rate policy and monetary 
policy were centralized and exercised by the European Central Bank with a mandate to 
ensure price stability in the eurozone. This regime, it was expected, would reproduce for 
the members of the Monetary Union the beneficial effects which the quasi-monetarist 
policies of the Bundesbank had produced for the German economy (Delors Committee 
1989; Commission 1990). 
Centralized monetary policy in a non-optimal currency zone
It is widely acknowledged, however, that the eurozone was not then and is not now what 
Robert Mundell (1961) defined as an “optimal currency area” (OCA) – an economic 
space, that is, in which centralized policies have similar impacts on all regions. By its own 
logic, a monetary union of national economies presupposes strongly converging infla-
tion rates in all member states (Flassbeck/Lapavitsas 2013). In fact, however, the euro-
4 MPIfG Discussion Paper 13/15
zone includes an extremely heterogeneous membership of former “hard-currency” and 
“soft-currency” economies with differing inflation dynamics driven by diverse sectoral 
structures, political-administrative institutions and practices and, above all, by different 
wage-setting institutions (Scharpf 1991; Calmfors 2001; Höpner/Schäfer 2012; Höpner 
2013). Hence, even though the ECB has succeeded in maintaining low inflation rates for 
the eurozone as a whole, national inflation rates continue to differ systematically.1 
These inflation differences did not initially prevent the strong convergence of nominal 
interest rates. But they had the effect of converting these into higher real interest rates in 
low-inflation countries, such as Germany, and into very low or even negative real inter-
est rates in the former “soft-currency” economies. As a consequence, aggregate domes-
tic demand was dampened in the first group of countries and stimulated by the sudden 
availability of very cheap credit in the second. The resulting economic divergence was 
then further enhanced by the monetary impulses of uniform ECB policies – which were, 
of course, too restrictive for the first, and too loose for the second group of economies. 
1 In May 2005, the ECB examined “Monetary policy and inflation differentials in a heterogeneous 
currency area” (<www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/pp61_77_mb200505en.pdf>) and noted that in 
the euro area such differences tended to persist over time, whereas they were reversed within a 
year or two in the United States. The article also noted that uniform ECB monetary policy could 
not respond to correct these national differences.
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The destabilizing effects of monetary union on heterogeneous member economies 
could have been foreseen, and they were in fact foreseen by – mostly American and 
Keynesian – economists (Eichengreen 1990; Eichengreen/Frieden 1994; Krugman 1990; 
Hagen/Neumann 1994; Feldstein 1997). On the political level in Europe, these warnings 
had played no role as the single currency was seen as a commitment to European inte-
gration in the face of apprehensions about German unification. And they were rejected 
on theoretical grounds in the Commission’s (1990) study entitled “One Market, One 
Money,” which, based on monetarist and rational-expectations assumptions, discount-
ed the effects of monetary impulses on the real economy. Moreover, it was expected that 
economic interaction in the Monetary Union itself would overcome the heterogeneity 
of eurozone economies. Reduced transaction costs would increase trade, and competi-
tion would equalize prices and discipline wage increases. At the same time, the removal 
of currency risks and of balance-of-payments constraints would facilitate cross-border 
capital flows to finance the catch-up development of relatively backward economies. In 
short, the benefits of monetary integration would greatly exceed the potential costs as-
sociated with the loss of autonomous exchange rates.
Many of these expectations were plausible as far as they went. But they were also incom-
plete. What, surprisingly, was not anticipated were the responses of rational economic 
actors at the micro level to the incentives and disincentives of monetary impulses – and 
the destabilizing effects which these would have on the macroeconomic levels. In fact, 
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Figure 2 Real effective exchange rates (1999−2008)
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high real interest rates did reduce the demand for credit in Germany and pushed the 
economy into the recession of 2001–2005, whereas in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain 
and Italy (the GIIPS economies), domestic demand was stimulated by the sudden avail-
ability of extremely cheap credit. The ECB was not merely unable to stabilize these 
economies; its uniform policies actually extended the booms and deepened the reces-
sions in the eurozone.2 
In the end, Germany, which had become the “sick man of Europe” at the beginning 
of the decade, managed to fight its recession through a combination of union wage 
restraint and supply-side reforms. In combination, these measures facilitated an export-
led recovery and a considerable expansion of low-wage employment. At the same time, 
however, the decline of domestic demand and rising exports generated massive external 
imbalances – increasing current-account surpluses and a progressive under-valuation 
of the real exchange rate. In the GIIPS economies, by contrast, credit-financed domestic 
demand continued to rise, and so did imports, economic growth (particularly in the 
real-estate sector), employment, and wages. And again, the outcome was a build-up of 
external imbalances – ever increasing current-account deficits and vastly over-valued 
real effective exchange rates that penalized exports, just as German exports were subsi-
dized by real under-valuation. 
Remarkably, however, these imbalances were not treated as a cause for concern by Eu-
ropean or national policy makers. Rising GIIPS deficits were easily financed by capital 
flows from Germany and other surplus countries, and thus seemed to support the origi-
nal expectation of beneficial catch-up development.3 The ECB on its part had succeed-
ed in ensuring the stability of consumer prices and saw no justification for intervening 
against asset-price inflation and the real-estate bubbles in Ireland and Spain. And since 
the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability Pact defined obligations only for national fiscal 
policy (which were over-fulfilled by Ireland and Spain, and no more violated by Portu-
gal than by Germany), neither the Commission nor national governments had a sense 
of an impending catastrophe. But all that changed with the onset of the international 
financial crisis in the fall of 2008.
2 De Grauwe (2012: 176–82) provides documentation of significantly diverging growth and infla-
tion rates, real interest rates, and housing prices, and he also describes the divergence between 
the ECB rate and “desired interest rates” of individual economies defined by reference to their 
output gaps. But he merely concludes that in the face of asymmetric shocks the ECB may be 
paralyzed, rather than that its policies act as destabilizing monetary impulses.
3 Even in November 2008, at the Fifth ECB Central Banking Conference, Andrew Rose (2009: 
251) concluded that “the EMU has created a virtuous circle; by increasing trade and the syn-
chronization of business cycles, EMU reduces the need for national monetary policy. That is, 
EMU seems along the path to becoming an optimum currency area.”
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Euro crisis and euro-rescue policies
The immediate effect of the Lehman collapse was a world-wide credit squeeze which 
brought all economies to their knees and forced all governments and central banks (in-
cluding the ECB) to revert to “Keynesian” reflation, and to save their over-extended but 
“system relevant” banks. Thus public-sector deficits escalated everywhere. But the credit 
squeeze hit hardest on those eurozone economies that had become totally dependent 
on capital inflows from abroad. Their economies were pushed into the deepest reces-
sion – which also meant that their public-sector debts, which had been extremely low 
in Ireland and Spain and no higher in Portugal than in Germany before 2008, rose most 
steeply thereafter. In effect, in these economies a large overhang of private-sector indebt-
edness was being transformed into public-sector debt. And when capital markets finally 
responded, the GIIPS economic crises were compounded by acute state-credit crises. 
From the perspective of investors, member states of the Monetary Union were generally 
more vulnerable than states indebted in their own currency because governments could 
not defend their solvency by printing money, and because the Maastricht prohibition of 
monetary state financing seemed to rule out the ECB as a lender of last resort (De Grau-
we 2012: 120). And within the Monetary Union, GIIPS states were the most likely targets 
of speculative attacks because their huge current-account deficits raised doubts about 
the capacity of their economies to service and repay the accumulated private and public-
sector debt. Hence risk premia on their government bonds increased steeply – which, as 
a self-fulfilling prophecy, could quickly drain the liquidity of national budgets, raising 
the specter of sovereign insolvency, first in Greece, and next in Ireland and Portugal.
Once governments in Germany and other surplus countries realized that a Greek bank-
ruptcy might trigger domino effects threatening other member states and ultimately 
the euro, they also had to consider how such insolvencies would affect the risk positions 
of their own banks which had transferred national savings and export surpluses to fi-
nance GIIPS current-account deficits. Moreover, a collapse of the euro would also have 
eliminated the export benefits of an under-valued real exchange rate. In this light, the 
commitment to “save the euro at any cost” and to disregard of the Maastricht Treaty’s 
“no bail-out clause” also served the national interest of the “creditor countries.” 
In the end, however, the creation of budget-supported euro-rescue funds and the ac-
cumulation of “Target-2” surpluses in the ECB balances of creditor central banks (Sinn/
Wollmershaeuser 2011) had the effect of transforming private-sector risks into public-
sector risks which, in the case of default, would have to be honored by creditor-state 
taxpayers. 
Moreover, as the Greek government had admitted that its deficit statistics had been 
fudged over the years, the euro crisis was widely attributed to the fiscal irresponsibility 
of the Greek and other GIIPS governments. And given this framing (which was only 
partly plausible for Greece and glaringly wrong for Ireland and Spain), rescue credits 
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coming from funds backed by national contributions were provided reluctantly, hesi-
tantly, and restrictively. And to reduce the need for further credits as quickly as possible, 
they were granted under rigid “conditionalities” requiring massive spending cutbacks 
and tax increases whose implementation was strictly controlled by a “Troika” of officials 
of the Commission, the ECB, and the IMF. As one could and should have expected, 
however, fiscal austerity in economies laboring under a deep recession would deepen 
the economic decline and thus increase public-sector deficits (Theodoropoulou/Watt 
2012; Krugman 2013). In effect, therefore, euro-rescue policies focusing not on the state 
of GIIPS economies but exclusively on their state-credit problems have pushed deficit 
countries into a deep and persistent economic and social crisis, with unemployment 
rates exceeding 25 percent and youth unemployment above 50 percent in Greece and 
Spain, and at excessively high levels in other deficit countries as well.
3 The new regime of euro governance
In the meantime, however, at least the threat of imminent sovereign insolvency seems 
to have abated. But the respite from market pressures was not achieved through the 
succession of rescue funds (whose guarantees, seen as “too little and too late,” did not 
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deter subsequent speculative attacks) but rather through the ECB’s unconditional com-
mitment to do “whatever it takes” to save the euro. In effect, the announcement that, 
if necessary, it would buy the bonds of challenged states through Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) was widely seen to imply that the ECB was now able and willing 
to act as a quasi-lender of last resort not only for banks but for governments as well. As 
a consequence, “austerity” requirements are no longer defended as an immediately ef-
fective remedy for state-credit crises, but have become part of a new euro regime whose 
purpose is to ensure the long-term viability of the Monetary Union and which goes far 
beyond the previous constraints on member-state fiscal policy. 
Revised problem perceptions and their implications 
The perceptions governing the present euro regime were formulated by the European 
Commission (2010) in the brief interval between the start of the international financial 
crisis and the rise of a manifest euro crisis in its report on “Intra-Euro-Area Competi-
tiveness and Imbalances.” It represents an astonishing, though unacknowledged, rever-
sal of the theory-based expectations which, in the Commission’s (1990) “One-Market-
One-Money” report, had justified and guided the creation of the Monetary Union. 
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Even though the monetarist-neoliberal paradigm remains unchallenged, the expecta-
tions derived from it have been modified radically. The belief that market forces would 
automatically overcome economic heterogeneity in the eurozone has disappeared. In-
stead, the first decade of the euro is described as a period of increasing imbalances of 
current accounts and dramatic losses of competiveness in some economies – which are 
now seen as the main threats to the “successful and sustainable functioning of EMU in 
the long term.” Instead of market forces, it is state action that should have prevented 
these and that must now be employed to correct their effects. But since the Commission 
cannot question the Monetary Union itself and its constraints, it also cannot discuss 
their contribution to the generation of imbalances. And even though greater economic 
homogeneity was and is now to be achieved through state action, the potential contri-
butions of macroeconomic (monetary and fiscal) management of aggregate demand at 
either European or national levels are completely ignored. 
By exclusion, therefore, the Commission’s problem analyses focus exclusively on what 
went wrong in national credit-, product- and labor markets – and the potential remedies 
it considers are all located at the national level. Deprived of all instruments of macroeco-
nomic management, governments are supposed to prevent and correct external imbal-
ances with their remaining instruments of regulatory and taxing and spending policies: 
It is therefore essential that Member States put in place an ambitious and comprehensive policy 
response geared at speeding up and improving intra-area adjustment mechanisms … The poli-
cy response should be comprehensive. It should cover measures in four key areas: fiscal policies, 
credit markets, labour markets, and product and service markets. (Commission 2010: 3)
The main part of the report is therefore devoted to country-specific discussions and recom-
mendations suggesting the problems that should be resolved by the governments in question. 
From soft recommendations to hardened requirements
When it was presented in January 2010, however, the report had no more force than the 
periodic recommendations of the “Broad Economic Policy Guidelines” and the exhorta-
tions of the “Lisbon Process,” which generally had little effect on national policy choices 
(Deroose/Hodson/Kuhlmann 2008). But that changed radically when the financial and 
economic crisis turned into a euro crisis and when rescue credits – first for Greece and 
then for Ireland and Portugal – were to be associated with tough “conditionalities” that 
were to be defined by the Commission and controlled by the Troika. These included 
not only extremely rigorous austerity requirements but also a wide range of “structural 
reforms” corresponding to the recommendations outlined in the 2010 report – except 
that now these could be enforced by withholding the next installment of the credits 
that would save the state from insolvency. And while the report had merely indicated 
the direction of reforms in general terms, the quarterly “Memoranda of Understand-
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ing” and the Troika’s compliance reports were and are concrete and detailed, spelling 
out which laws and regulations must be abolished or changed; which organizations are 
to be abolished or reorganized; which state functions and state-owned enterprises have 
to be privatized; which salaries, welfare benefits and minimum wages must be cut; and 
how many public-sector jobs have to be eliminated. 
Initially, of course, these powers were available only if a member state had applied for 
rescue credits – as of now, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus and soon perhaps Slo-
venia. But in December 2011, Council and Parliament adopted a “Six Pack” of regula-
tions and directives that apply to all EMU member states, regardless of any immediate 
threats of state insolvency. Together with the “Two Pack,” the “European Semester,” the 
“Fiscal Pact,” and the recent agreement on centralized banking supervision they consti-
tute a new governance regime for the Monetary Union that extends centralized compe-
tences far beyond their reach under the rules of the Maastricht Treaty. 
The regime’s most ambitious and potentially revolutionary element is the “Excessive 
Imbalance Procedure” (EIP) established by two regulations for the “Prevention and 
Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances” (EU 1174 and 1176/2011). They extend the 
Commission’s supervision, control, and sanctioning powers to an undefined range of 
national policy areas, without any reference to the division of European and national 
competences. What matters is that the new powers will finally satisfy “the need for a 
stronger framework, and reinforced governance, including financial disincentives, to 
ensure that recommendations are appropriately taken into account at national level” 
(Commission 2012b).
Technically, the EIP uses a Commission-defined “Scoreboard” of – at present – eleven 
statistical indicators which, together with upper and lower thresholds, are meant to 
define the range of potential external and internal imbalances4 that will be monitored 
continuously by the Commission. Findings are presented in periodic “alert mechanism 
reports,” leading to “in-depth reviews” of economies in which imbalances have been 
identified. If the Commission finds an “excessive imbalance,” the next step will be “a set 
of policy recommendations to be followed and a deadline within which the Member 
State concerned is to submit a corrective action plan” (1176/2011, Art. 7.2). If accepted 
by the Commission and Council, the plan becomes binding. If the Commission is not 
satisfied with its implementation, it may propose a “decision establishing non-compli-
ance,” which will become effective unless the Council opposes it by a qualified majority 
(1176/2011, Art. 10.4). The next step then are sanctioning procedures, imposing an 
interest-bearing deposit of 0.1 percent of GDP in the case of non-compliance, and an 
annual fine in the same amount in cases of repeated non-compliance or repeated failure 
4 These include current accounts, capital accounts, export market shares, unit labor costs, real 
effective exchange rates, private sector debt, private sector credit flows, changes in house prices, 
general government debt, unemployment rates and financial sector liabilities.
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to submit an acceptable corrective action plan. Again, sanctions proposed by the Com-
mission can be stopped by the Council only through reverse-qualified-majority votes 
(1174/2011, Art. 3).
Quite apart from the decision rule disabling the Council’s political control, this regime 
is remarkable for several reasons. First, with the exception of public-sector debt, none 
of the economic imbalances listed in the Scoreboard are directly under the control of 
national governments. It is simply assumed that they might be indirectly influenced 
through the use of policy instruments available to member states. Second, the regula-
tions do not specify which national competences may be affected. Instead, 
recommendations … should be addressed to the Member State concerned to provide guidance 
on appropriate policy responses. The policy response of the Member State …  should use all avail-
able policy instruments under the control of public authorities. (Regulation 1176/2011 at #20)
In other words, the “constitutional” allocation of European and national competences 
that was achieved in the Lisbon Treaty will not constrain the domain of binding “rec-
ommendations” once the Excessive Imbalance Procedure is initiated. Moreover, the reg-
ulations provide no rules for the Commission’s substantive policy choices. Since these 
must be country-specific and respond to highly contingent and variable conditions, 
they must be based on the Commission’s interpretation of information obtained in its 
in-depth reviews. Unlike the original Stability Pact, therefore, the Excessive Imbalance 
Procedure is not, and cannot be, a rule-based regime. What has been set up is meant to 
be a legally and politically unconstrained expert regime. But that, of course, does not 
ensure its problem-solving effectiveness.
What if the new regime had been in place?
At the time of writing, the effectiveness of the new regime cannot yet be assessed on 
the basis of its empirical record. Nevertheless, one may explore, counterfactually, how 
it could have prevented the escalation of imbalances in the early years of the Monetary 
Union and, hypothetically, how it could deal with the present crisis of the eurozone. In 
this assessment, two constraints must be treated as given. 
First, the new euro regime does not modify the fundamental deficiencies of a Monetary 
Union in a non-optimal currency area. In other words, nominal exchange rates can-
not be adjusted, and monetary policy must be uniform for the eurozone. Given initial 
differences among member economies, it will thus continue to generate pro-cyclically 
destabilizing and divergence-increasing monetary impulses for economies with above-
average and below-average inflationary dynamics (Enderlein 2004; Notre Europe 2012). 
And, second, the Fiscal Pact and the Six-Pack and Two-Pack regulations have strength-
ened, rather than relaxed, the rules preventing the use of expansionary fiscal policies 
at the national level. The question is, therefore, whether the policy instruments still 
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available to national governments (assuming that the Commission could achieve full 
control over their exercise) would suffice to counteract the rise of internal and external 
imbalances in four different economic constellations. 
1999–2008: Could the rise of imbalances have been prevented?
Beginning with the problems of overheating economies, such as Spain or Ireland, it seems 
plausible that higher taxes on consumption and on wage and retirement incomes could 
have dampened the credit-financed rise of domestic demand. Moreover, governments 
could have used regulations to restrict the availability or attractiveness of consumer and 
housing credit. By contrast, there is little they could have done to prevent the rise of unit 
labor costs directly. Experience has shown that statutory wage controls in an expanding 
economy are bound to fail (Scharpf 1991), and the institutional preconditions under 
which unions and employers may be able to agree on and enforce voluntary wage re-
straint are extremely demanding and highly path-dependent – and they definitely did 
not exist in pre-crisis Southern Europe or Ireland (Höpner 2013). Moreover, the sup-
ply-side reforms which the Commission is presently imposing through its Memoranda 
of Understanding would have been counterproductive in the mid-2000s: the more that 
wage setting is decentralized and market-driven, the more rapidly would wages increase 
in a rising market. If wages are upwardly flexible, in other words, the rise of unit labor 
costs could be stopped only by the rise of mass unemployment. 
Turning to the problems of depressed economies, such as Germany (2001–2005), declin-
ing domestic demand did reduce imports and contribute to the rise of current-account 
surpluses. But since monetary reflation as well as fiscal reflation through tax cuts and 
deficit spending were ruled out,5 it is not clear what the Commission could have recom-
mended to directly increase domestic demand. Even if wage increases had been consid-
ered (Flassbeck/Lapavitsas 2013), unions would have feared the further escalation of 
unemployment. In the Commission’s theoretical framework, therefore, the only remedy 
would be deflation: prices would have to fall so that demand could increase in real terms. 
But since market prices are not under direct government control, the effect could be 
achieved only by reducing the labor costs of production – which from the Commis-
sion’s perspective should be considered a dilemma as it would also increase external im-
balances. In any case, this is what in fact happened in Germany, where voluntary union 
wage restraint was combined with supply-side “reforms” that deregulated employment 
rules and reduced the reservation wages of the unemployed. In the end, the strategy fa-
cilitated an export-led economic recovery and the expansion of low-wage and atypical 
employment in services. But it also generated rising current account surpluses, capital 
exports, and a greatly undervalued real effective exchange rate, which of course contrib-
5 Germany was already violating the deficit rules of the Stability Pact because of the operation of 
“automatic stabilizers.” 
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uted to the loss of competitiveness of the GIIPS economies. In effect, therefore, even if 
the present euro regime had already been in place in 1999, it could not have prevented 
the rise of external imbalances. 
2009–2013: How could the new regime correct the effects of the crisis?
Even if state insolvencies will be averted by the ECB’s promise of OMT operations and 
the conditional availability of ESM credits, and even if additional banking crises should 
be prevented by a Banking Union, the GIIPS economies of the eurozone are still suffer-
ing from massive internal and external imbalances: after a deep decline, and after three 
years of euro-rescue operations, economic activity is still falling or at best stagnant, 
while public-sector debt continues to rise. Moreover, general unemployment, youth 
unemployment, and poverty have risen to catastrophic levels. And even though the de-
pression has reduced domestic demand and wages, current accounts are still in deficit 
and, with the potential exception of Ireland, the “internal devaluation” in crisis econo-
mies is still far from approaching parity of real-effective exchange rates in the eurozone. 
Under these conditions, the present euro regime will continue to insist on fiscal auster-
ity and supply-side reforms to reduce external deficits and to improve competitiveness. 
As long as real effective exchange rates are significantly overvalued, internal devaluation 
and falling unit labor costs must be achieved by lowering nominal wages. Moreover, the 
Commission’s recommendations seem to assume that under the pressure of mass un-
employment, market-driven wages will fall more rapidly than would wages determined 
by collective bargaining. Hence its Memoranda of Understanding for the recipients of 
rescue credits have combined union-busting policies with austerity and supply-side re-
forms that have the effect of increasing the competition between employees and the 
unemployed (Scharpf 2011). If the economic and social crises nevertheless continue, it 
would suggest that wages have not yet fallen sufficiently to permit the expansion of low-
wage employment and the export-led economic growth which pulled Germany out of 
its recession after 2005. In short: efforts must be increased. 
Surplus economies such as Germany are not threatened by sovereign insolvency, and 
though their external imbalances contribute to the problems of deficit economies, they 
do not directly challenge the stability of the euro. So while the Excessive Imbalance Pro-
cedure seems to address surpluses as well as deficits, the Commission (2012) decided to 
disregard Germany’s continuing current-account surpluses and the still increasing un-
der-valuation of its real effective exchange rate. One reason6 might be that reducing 
6 That Germany’s share in the exports of GIIPS economies is quite small may also play a role, 
varying between 8.7 percent in Ireland and 12.6 percent in Italy in 2010, while the aggregate 
share of GIIPS economies in German exports amounts to 11.1 percent (OECD data). Hence the 
direct effect of higher domestic demand or reduced competitiveness in Germany on any one of 
the crisis economies might be quite small.
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German competitiveness in the euro area would also weaken the eurozone’s perfor-
mance vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Beyond that, however, it is also hard to see what 
measures the Commission could actually have required to increase domestic demand 
and unit labor costs in Germany. Given the constraints of the Fiscal Pact, it could not 
ask the government to resort to deficit spending and tax cuts. It also could not ask for 
legislation requiring consumers and firms to save less and spend more, or requiring 
unions and employers to agree on higher wages in the private sector. In short, the new 
euro regime appears powerless to deal with the external imbalances of surplus econo-
mies because national governments lack effective policy instruments. 
4 The euro regime: What is gained and what was lost? 
Exit from the Monetary Union is not seriously considered by European or national 
policy makers and their academic advisors because it is seen to be associated with pro-
hibitive, but largely unexplored economic and political risks. Nevertheless, it is useful 
to compare the problem-solving capacity of the present euro regime with the capacities 
member states lost when they joined the euro, if only for the purpose of illustrating the 
challenges that have to be faced if the euro is to be maintained. 
Limited gains
Compared to the euphoria of the “One Market, One Money” campaign (Commis-
sion 1990), present defenses of the euro appear much sobered. But they still insist that 
the single currency has increased Europe’s weight in global financial affairs; that it has 
greatly reduced transaction costs by eliminating internal and dampening external cur-
rency fluctuations; and that it has eliminated the temptations of competitive devalua-
tion among its members. I will refrain from commenting on the first, quasi-geopolitical 
argument, but the other two deserve some attention.
Yes, the heavier mass of the euro has dampened the effects of exchange rate volatility 
on eurozone economies, but countries such as Sweden or Norway and firms serving 
world-wide markets seem to have learned to deal with these effects, just as tourists have 
learned to use cash machines when landing at Heathrow and to use credit cards in Swiss 
restaurants and taxis. So the benefits of lower transaction costs may not be quite so 
overwhelming. And yes, the members of the Monetary Union are no longer exposed to 
speculative attacks on their national currencies. But under the previous regimes of ex-
change-rate coordination (Bretton Woods or the European Monetary System of 1979–
1999), such attacks were not very frequent and they tended to occur only if speculators 
had reason to think that a country was trying to defend an unrealistic exchange rate. 
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And while euro states are now indeed secure from attacks on their exchange rates, they 
must fear speculative attacks on the solvency of their sovereign debt, which would not 
occur if they were indebted in their own currency.
Instead of nominal devaluation, competitive real devaluation
And yes, the Monetary Union has definitely eliminated the temptation of competitive 
devaluation among its members. But devaluations were never popular, and governments 
had to admit failure if they used them as a last resort in trying to cope with a loss of ex-
ternal competitiveness. So one wonders how tempting competitive devaluation was and 
would be in political practice. What seems much more worrying, by comparison, is that 
the Monetary Union and the Commission’s explicit precepts are forcing member states 
to play a negative-sum game of competitive “internal” or real devaluation when they 
have to deal with external deficits or with a domestic recession and rising unemploy-
ment. Even if in economic terms nominal and real devaluation were equally effective, 
their distributional impacts are quite different. 
Nominal devaluation is egalitarian. It reduces real incomes by raising the price of im-
ports and of foreign vacations for everybody, rich and poor. And it can be achieved by 
a single decision of the government or the central bank. Real devaluation, by contrast, 
may be achieved through union wage restraint in those countries where large, internally 
centralized and economically sophisticated unions are able and willing to choose and 
implement this strategy. Everywhere else, however, the effect will have to be achieved 
indirectly, through welfare cutbacks and supply-side reforms that increase the pressure 
of mass unemployment and competition between the employed and the unemployed. 
In either case, moreover, the burden falls exclusively on workers, while capital owners 
will benefit from measures that are meant to improve the profitability of investments. 
Obstacles to the management of aggregate demand
The Monetary Union abolished the warning signal of a deteriorating balance of pay-
ments which forces countries with an independent currency to do something about 
the loss of external competitiveness. And long before such countries would consider 
devaluation as an option, they would resort to the instruments of monetary and fiscal 
deflation and reflation in trying to correct external and internal economic imbalances. 
These instruments could be employed symmetrically, to deal with recessions as well as 
booms in individual economies and to correct surpluses as well as deficits in their exter-
nal balances. The present EMU regime, by contrast, is designed to deal with the prob-
lems of national economies only if these generate external imbalances that may threaten 
the stability of the euro. And it is not suited to addressing these problems symmetrically. 
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If the initial problem of a national economy is one of excess demand, leading to rising 
inflation and a loss of competitiveness, the Excessive Imbalance Procedure may be able 
to compel national governments to reduce domestic demand by raising taxes on con-
sumption and personal incomes and by regulations that increase the cost or reduce the 
availability of consumer, housing, and investment credit. But to counteract the effect of 
pro-cyclical monetary impulses, restrictive policies will either have to be very strong, or 
they must cut-in very early in the upswing – which may result in business cycles charac-
terized either by over- and undershooting or by hectic stop-go patterns. Moreover, the 
use of highly intrusive tax and regulatory policies for the purposes of short-term mac-
roeconomic management will not only encounter more political resistance but will also 
undermine the stability of the institutional environment, which may matter for investor 
expectations. In short, even if they were to be effective in dampening domestic demand, 
the political and economic efficiency of these measures may be doubtful.7
Effectiveness is even more problematic, however, if the initial problem of a national 
economy is insufficient demand, associated with rising unemployment and stagnating 
or falling unit labor costs – which, again, will be exacerbated by pro-cyclical monetary 
impulses. If rising surpluses of current and capital accounts and declining real effective 
exchange rates are considered as excessive imbalances, the present regime rules out fis-
cal interventions that would increase domestic demand directly through tax cuts and 
public investments, and it is questionable whether a loosening of credit regulations 
would have much effect when the expectations of consumers and investors are negative. 
Thus the Commission would be unable to recommend policies that could correct the 
decline of imports and rise of current-account surpluses. 
And if internal imbalances were to be considered as well, the euro regime would be faced 
with the dilemma illustrated by the German response to the recession of 2001–2005: if 
the country succeeds in achieving an export-led recovery through internal devaluation, 
its surpluses will be the deficits of others, and its gain in relative competitiveness will be 
matched by the losses of other member economies. And the only allowable response to 
a loss of competitiveness is, of course, again internal devaluation. In other words, by its 
own economic logic, the present euro regime creates compulsory cycles of real devalu-
ation – which, unlike the temptations of nominal devaluation, amount to a race to the 
bottom that must asymmetrically depress wages and working conditions and increase 
social inequality in all eurozone economies.
7 Milton Friedman is alleged to have said: the advantage of monetary policy is that it is a lot easier 
to change the price of money than to manipulate thousands of relative prices.
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Global capitalism and self-inflicted helplessness
It should be emphasized, moreover, that these asymmetric pressures are self-inflicted. 
They are an effect of the euro regime that has nothing to do with the pressures and 
constraints of globalized product and capital markets. Of course, all highly industrial-
ized countries are affected by the rising share and increasing competitiveness of thresh-
old economies in global product markets, and all of them will be faced with a decline 
of their relative – and perhaps also absolute – prosperity. But countries outside the 
Monetary Union may choose between accepting and moderating this decline through a 
gently declining nominal exchange rate, or fighting it through vigorous – and inequality 
increasing – efforts to defend competitiveness through real devaluation. 
And of course all capitalist democracies are affected by the worsening terms of trade 
between labor and the state, on one side, and capital, on the other. It was brought about 
by the removal of barriers to capital movement, by the deregulation of capital markets, 
and by the rise of a type of financial capitalism that is largely disconnected from the 
need to make profits through employment-creating investments in the real economy 
(Streeck 2013). But countries outside the Monetary Union and the EU have at least 
the freedom to explore and invent coping strategies that would increase their ability to 
defend their own social and political priorities. Even sailboats, after all, may reach their 
chosen goals though they have no control over wind and waves.8 Policy makers in the 
eurozone, by contrast, have their responses doubly constrained by the euro regime and 
by the inexorable progress of negative integration and market-enhancing prohibitions 
imposed by internal-market rules and European competition law (Scharpf 1999, 2010). 
But could the regime be patched?
In the meantime, political dissatisfaction with the present euro regime is growing, not 
only in the crisis economies but also among center-left political parties elsewhere and 
even among policy makers at the European level. Moreover, economists who are critical 
of the monetarist-neoliberal paradigm of the present regime have begun to explore the 
possibility of Keynesian remedies to the current crisis. But since the political and aca-
demic critics remain committed to defending the Monetary Union, they cannot chal-
8 Much of the pro-euro discussion on the European Left is, in my view, affected by a “powering” 
bias and a neglect of “coping” options. The euro is seen as a precondition for re-achieving po-
litical control over the capitalist economy that has been lost at the national level (for example, 
Habermas 2011, 2013). That makes it hard to accept the insight that the euro itself – and Euro-
pean economic integration in general – are a major part of the problem, rather than its solution. 
And that framing also seems to foreclose the search for coping strategies that could work at the 
national level. 
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lenge its basic structural deficiencies and functional requirements. As a consequence, 
their proposals must be seen as add-ons or patches to the current regime. I will discuss 
three of these.
The first proposal, wage coordination, which had played a role in Keynesian regimes be-
fore these were displaced by monetarism (Scharpf 1991), is now promoted as a solution 
to the euro crisis in a study commissioned by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation of the 
German Left Party (Flassbeck/Lapavitsas 2013). It suggests that wage setting in all eu-
rozone economies should follow the “Golden Rule,” according to which nominal wage 
increases should be defined by the rise of labor productivity plus the inflation target of 
the ECB. The proposal resonates with the Commission’s (2010) belief that divergent in-
creases of unit labor costs were the proximate causes of divergent competitiveness. And 
since uniform ECB monetary policies have destabilizing effects only if national infla-
tion rates differ, the presumed influence of wage increases on inflation suggests that ef-
fective wage coordination might in fact remove the fundamental problem of monetary 
union in a non-optimal currency area. In other words, if the proposal were realized, it 
could greatly improve the economic viability of the Monetary Union. Unfortunately, 
however, the proposal fails to address at least two fundamental difficulties.
The first is that it comes too late. It might have worked if it had been adopted and 
implemented in 1999 when, presumably, nominal and real exchange rates were roughly 
in agreement among all eurozone economies – and could then have been stabilized 
through the Golden Rule. In the meantime, however, they have diverged dramatically. 
And even if the Rule were now faithfully applied not only in GIIPS economies but in 
Germany as well, it would, by the authors’ own estimate, take one or two decades to 
achieve full convergence of unit labor costs and real exchange rates. If that waiting peri-
od might appear too long, one would still be left with the Commission’s present regime 
of imposed real devaluation through nominal wage cuts.
The second problem is that the proposal ignores its own institutional preconditions (Sos-
kice/Iversen 1998). To appreciate it, one must understand that wage coordination would 
require the Golden Rule to be followed equally, when market wages rise in a boom and 
when they fall in a recession. In the first constellation, that presupposes large “encom-
passing” (Olson 1982) unions with a centralized leadership that is powerful enough to 
constrain wage demands when the economy is booming and inflation rising. But union 
wage restraint could not be maintained unless equally encompassing employers’ associa-
tions were able to prevent “wage drift” by disciplining firms offering higher wages in a 
tight labor market. And in a downturn, these employers’ associations would have to agree 
to above-market wage increases, and together with the unions they would also have to 
prevent plant-level wage concessions that might save local jobs (Kenworthy 2001). 
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These institutional preconditions have never been fully realized anywhere, but they were 
approximated for limited periods in a few countries, whereas even serious efforts to 
create them in some other countries have proven to be impossible (Scharpf 1991; Has-
sel 2006). In the majority of eurozone countries, they do not exist (Du Caju/Gautier/
Momferatou/Ward-Warmedinger 2008; Höpner 2013). Worse still, the Commission is 
presently committed to destroying the possibility of institutionalized wage coordina-
tion. In its mistaken belief that wage flexibility would ensure economic convergence in 
the Monetary Union, it has used the conditionalities of euro-rescue credits to disable 
collective bargaining agreements and to radically decentralize wage setting in the spirit 
of the “union-busting” campaigns launched by Thatcher and Reagan in the 1980s. In 
short, it seems extremely unlikely that the essentially neo-liberal euro regime could be 
significantly improved through attempts at Keynesian wage coordination.
The second proposal of an anti-cyclical fiscal capacity in the form of a “cyclical adjust-
ment insurance fund” to be established at the European level was introduced in June 
2012 in a report by the “Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Group” of European economists 
(Notre Europe 2012: 30–32). It was also alluded to in communications of the President 
of the European Council, but then ignored in subsequent Council conclusions and in 
the Commission’s (2012a) “Blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary 
union.”9 But the idea was taken up again in the report of the four presidents (of the Eu-
ropean Council, the Commission, the Euro Group, and the ECB) which emphasized the 
need for a “common but limited shock absorption function” that “could take the form 
of an insurance-type system between euro area countries. Contributions from, and dis-
bursements to, national budgets would fluctuate according to each country’s position 
over the economic cycle” (Van Rompuy et al. 2012: 10–11).10 In the meantime, more-
over, Enderlein, Guttenberg and Spiess (2013) have specified the concept of a cyclical 
adjustment insurance fund in greater detail and presented a simulation study to show 
that transfers reflecting the differences between individual-country output gaps and the 
eurozone average would have smoothed the business cycles of all member economies.
The proposal is remarkable for two reasons: first, it acknowledges the existence of the 
pro-cyclically destabilizing impacts of uniform monetary policy – which could not oc-
cur in the monetarist-rational-expectations paradigm that governed the creation of the 
Monetary Union. And, second, it acknowledges the need for anti-cyclical fiscal impulses 
to counteract the monetary effects – which are ruled out by the Stability Pact and the 
Fiscal Pact. If these insights had guided the Commission’s (1990) “One Market, One 
9 The Commission did demand a fiscal capacity to finance its proposed “Convergence and Com-
petitive Instrument” – meaning financial incentives supporting bilateral contractual agreements 
on supply-side “structural reforms” (Commission 2012a: 21–23).
10 The report of the four presidents also mentions anti-cyclical subsidies to national unemploy-
ment insurance systems as a potential variant.
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Money” analyses and the Maastricht Treaty, the euro would not have created quite the 
crises it did. The question is, however, whether the remedies, if they were adopted now, 
would also help to cope with the crises that were in fact produced. 
One question concerns the relative effectiveness of counter-cyclical fiscal reflation when 
it conflicts with pro-cyclical monetary deflation. In German economic history, at any 
rate, there have been several instances in which the Bundesbank’s monetary restraint 
killed the effects of the government’s fiscal expansion (Scharpf 1991). But that is not 
the main caveat. The proposal is meant to dampen cyclical fluctuations, and it explicitly 
distinguishes these from structural problems in order to avoid the politically controver-
sial implications of long-term asymmetric transfers among EMU member states. But of 
course the massive and persistent macroeconomic imbalances in the eurozone consti-
tute structural rather than cyclical problems. And under the present euro regime these 
are dealt with through austerity requirements and supply-side reforms aimed at reduc-
ing domestic demand and unit labor costs to overcome external imbalances. In the crisis 
countries, therefore, the expansionary effect of anti-cyclical fiscal impulses would not 
only have to counteract pro-cyclical monetary impulses (at the time of writing, ECB 
monetary policy is considered too loose for Germany and still too restrictive for GIIPS 
economies), but also the deflationary effects of the austerity requirements. That surely 
is more than these proposals could achieve. 
Going beyond that, some of the critiques imply a program of growth promotion through 
fiscal reflation that would be strong enough to counteract restrictive monetary impulses 
in the crisis economies. Such ideas seem to find increasing support among left-of-center 
political parties, unions and academics, who continue to denounce the rigid auster-
ity requirements imposed on the crisis countries (for example, Blyth 2013; Krugman 
2013). If these were merely relaxed, of course, renewed deficit spending would simply 
reproduce the state credit crises. So a major fiscal stimulus would have to be financed ei-
ther through significantly subsidized external credit (through Eurobonds or the OMTs 
of the ECB) or through massive fiscal transfers from the surplus states to the deficit 
states. The problem is, however, that the economic impact of massive fiscal reflation, 
assuming its political feasibility, would directly counteract the intended effects of the 
present euro regime. 
The present regime tries to reduce external deficits through austerity and the loss of 
competitiveness through internal devaluation – and it accepts mass unemployment and 
the rise of poverty as a necessary price, at least in the medium term. Massive fiscal refla-
tion would definitely increase domestic demand and perhaps domestic investment. But 
regardless of how it is to be financed, it would again increase imports and thus reverse 
the beginning decline of current-account deficits. Hence the overall dependence of the 
economy on capital imports would rise again. Worse yet, if fiscal reflation were to be 
effective in increasing employment, it would reduce, or even reverse, the downward 
pressures on nominal wages, on which the success of the internal-devaluation strategy 
depends. If real devaluation were to fail, however, and if production in the GIIPS econo-
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mies were to remain uncompetitive, job-creating private investment would occur only 
if and as long as it was publicly subsidized. Under such conditions, even the European 
Marshall Plan that is presently being promoted by the German Social Democrats could 
not ensure a self-sustaining economic recovery.11 
That is of course not meant to deny the need for substantial transfers to avert a social 
catastrophe in the crisis countries by stabilizing their failing health-care, education, and 
social-assistance systems. But it would require a very skillful (and quite unlikely) man-
agement of potential policy conflicts12 to avoid outcomes that would condemn recipient 
countries to a permanent loss of economic self-sufficiency and political autonomy.13
To conclude, it seems that within the institutional framework of the Monetary Union, 
currently discussed “Keynesian” additions or modifications of the essentially monetar-
ist euro regime could not significantly improve the short- and medium-term economic 
prospects of the crisis countries. Fiscal transfers would be important for stabilizing 
social-support systems and alleviating mass poverty, and they might also soften the 
impact of supply-side policies that are meant to improve competitiveness. But they are 
also likely to extend the period of economic stagnation and contribute to a permanent 
economic and political dependence on external transfers. 
5 Input legitimacy of the present euro regime? 
From an output-oriented perspective, in other words, the prospects of a successful reso-
lution of the euro crisis appear dim. If the Monetary Union is to be maintained, both 
of the competing policy approaches – monetarist/supply-side and Keynesian/demand-
side – are associated with strongly negative side effects. Worse yet, both have extremely 
asymmetric distributional consequences: the present euro regime imposes massive sac-
rifices on the deficit countries, while protecting the creditor positions and export inter-
ests of the surplus countries. By contrast, the Keynesian alternative would alleviate the 
misery of the deficit societies but would depend on massive transfers at the expense of 
11 The success of the original Marshall Plan in postwar West Germany came after a massive de-
valuation of the newly introduced Deutschmark. 
12 If transfers were used, for instance, to increase unemployment benefits, the increase of reser-
vation wages would damage competitiveness; if they were to reduce employee contributions 
to unemployment insurance, rising domestic demand would increase current-account deficits; 
but if additional funds were used to reduce employer contributions, they would reduce produc-
tion costs and might improve competitiveness as well as the current-account balance. 
13 When East Germany was united with West Germany at a grossly overvalued exchange rate 
which was not corrected through internal devaluation, it took more than two decades, two tril-
lion euros of West-East transfers and subsidies, plus a massive out-migration to raise per capita 
GDP in the eastern regions to about 70 percent of the Western level.
Scharpf: Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area 23
taxpayers and public services in the surplus countries. It is in the light of these dismal 
choices in the output dimension that the prospects of European democratic legitimacy 
need to be discussed.
In its present form, the euro regime’s claim to acceptance depends on the output-ori-
ented and uncertain promise that the policies pursued by the ECB and imposed by 
Council and the Commission will, in the foreseeable future, facilitate the economic re-
covery of the crisis countries, and that they will thereafter prevent the generation of 
new macroeconomic imbalances among the members of the Monetary Union. These 
choices have been taken and are presently taken in an institutional setting that provides 
near-perfect protection against the interference of input-oriented political processes 
and of democratic accountability to the constituencies affected.
The lack of democratic accountability is most obvious in the case of the European Cen-
tral Bank, which has become a crucially important policy maker in the new euro re-
gime. Its autonomy is institutionalized much more rigidly than was true of the German 
Bundesbank, whose authority depended on popular support and whose formal status 
could have been changed by simple parliamentary majority. Initially, the ECB’s claim to 
output-oriented legitimacy had rested on the belief that its mandate to ensure price sta-
bility in the eurozone would constitute an unmitigated collective good. It was weakened 
by the unequal distributive impacts of its rule-bound policies on individual member 
states. And the belief in rule-bound monetary policy itself has been damaged by the 
bank’s commitment to discretionary, highly visible, and politically controversial policy 
choices in the course of doing “what it takes to save the euro.” So far, however, the ECB’s 
gamble on its output legitimacy has not yet provoked serious proposals to subject the 
exercise of its potent governing powers to input-oriented democratic accountability.
In a somewhat similar fashion, the powerful role of the European Commission in Eu-
ropean legislation and in the interpretation and enforcement of European law has 
long depended on the output-oriented – and, as Vivien Schmidt (2013) has insisted, 
throughput-oriented – authority of a politically independent and neutral trustee of 
the European common interest and of a protector of smaller member states against the 
bargaining power of the big ones. That authority has been undermined by its exercise 
of highly intrusive, discretionary, and highly divisive governing powers in the context of 
euro-rescue policies and of the new euro regime. And it does not really matter whether 
its role is now seen as that of a subservient agent of the current preferences of Angela 
Merkel or, as I would suggest, as the ideologically committed agent of a monetarist sup-
ply-side program: in either case, the Commission and its actions have lost the aura of 
neutrality and objectivity. Its policies cut deeply into the economic and social structures 
and policy legacies of member polities, and they conflict with the highly salient interests 
and preferences of national constituencies. At the same time, the possibility of political 
correction by the Council has been greatly reduced through the reverse-QMV rule. In 
other words, the Commission has assumed a role that urgently requires, but completely 
lacks, input-oriented democratic legitimacy and accountability. 
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But even if the Commission’s recommendations had to be positively approved by a vote 
in the euro group Council (which would, of course, exclude the target government), 
they would still lack input-oriented democratic legitimacy. The votes of national minis-
ters or heads of state and government are arguably legitimated indirectly through their 
accountability to national parliaments and voters. But the German electorate could at 
best authorize its representatives to accept sacrifices for Germany individually, or to 
agree to common rules that will bind all member states. But the indirect accountability 
of governments acting in the “intergovernmental” mode at the European level (Scharpf 
2001) could not justify the imposition of unilateral, involuntary, and totally discretion-
ary sacrifices on a particular member state and its people. From the perspective of the 
Portuguese people, therefore, even positive Council votes supporting rescue “condition-
alities” and sanction-backed Commission decrees can in no way be construed as “self-
government.” They have the quality of being ruled by foreign governments. 
The European Parliament, finally, has adopted the Six Pack regulations establishing the 
institutional framework of the Excessive Deficit and the Excessive Imbalance Proce-
dures. But it did not and could not adopt general rules defining either the domain of 
national competences to be controlled or the type of measures and the conditions un-
der which they could be imposed. In other words, the EP in its legislative role consented 
to the establishment of a discretionary authority, but it does not and could not have a 
role in the execution of that authority.
In short, the governing powers exercised by the ECB, the Commission, and the Coun-
cil in the present euro regime are not directly or indirectly supported by institutional 
mechanisms of input-oriented democratic accountability. Instead, they are publicly jus-
tified by output-oriented arguments asserting their necessity for coping with the cur-
rent crises and for stabilizing the Monetary Union. In the preceding section, I raised 
doubts about the problem-solving effectiveness of this regime. In any case, however, the 
legitimacy of a technocratic-authoritarian regime that depends exclusively on output-
oriented promises, and whose exercise of governing powers interferes massively and 
visibly with the interests and life chances of millions of citizens, must be considered 
extremely fragile. If its performance were to fail, the impact on the political support of 
European integration itself could be fatal. 
6 Could political union provide the solution?
In current debates it is often asserted that it was a mistake to create a Monetary Union 
without at the same time creating a European Political Union. What that would have 
meant, however, was unclear in the 1990s. And it remains unclear now, with suggestions 
envisioning at one extreme a fully democratized “United States of Europe” (or of the 
eurozone?) with a large central budget, centralized economic and social policies, and 
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German-style interregional fiscal equalization, and at the other extreme some formal 
transfers of competences to legalize present practices and some parliamentary controls 
to improve the appearance of democratic legitimacy for what needs to be done and is 
being done anyway. In other words, some see the euro crisis as an opportunity to create 
a democratic federal state, while others seek a semblance of electoral legitimacy to im-
munize the present euro regime against political challenges. But the nature of the euro 
crisis, combined with the nature of democratic politics, is likely to frustrate maximal as 
well as minimal aspirations.
The risk of politicization
The risk is most obvious for the minimalist position. At present, European citizens must 
suffer the impact of the crisis and of the de-politicized euro regime either in stoic ac-
ceptance or in helpless frustration. Merely greater involvement of the European Parlia-
ment would not change that because, from the citizens’ perspective, EP elections do not 
influence European policy choices and cannot enforce the electoral accountability of 
European governors. But if the plans presently pursued by some of the European “party 
families” should succeed in “politicizing” EP elections and in selecting the candidate of 
the winning coalition as President of the Commission, European elections might begin 
to matter and political apathy might not persist. 
However, if European policies were then to be perceived as matters of political choice 
and if political parties were to try to mobilize voters for or against such choices, the 
most likely outcome would be escalating opposition to the present regime, probably 
combined with escalating North-South and class-based conflict that might destroy the 
capacity for consensual decision making on which the European Union has so far de-
pended. In other words, the present euro regime based on monetarist-neoliberal theo-
retical premises and on policies enforcing austerity and supply-side reforms can survive 
only if it continues to be protected against the direct influence of politicized mass pub-
lics. But should it survive?
That it should not survive is the hope of left-of-center and pro-European democrats. Its 
far-reaching ambitions are represented by works of Jürgen Habermas (2011, 2013) or 
Stefan Collignon (2013) and others who consider the euro crisis as an opportunity for 
creating the conditions of democratic self-government at the European level. Only at 
that level, so it is hoped, is there a chance of re-establishing democratic political control 
over the capitalist economy that nation-states have progressively and irretrievably lost 
since the 1970s (Streeck 2013). But since the loss of national control has been largely the 
result of liberalizing and deregulatory policies pursued by the EU (Scharpf 1999, 2010), 
left-of-center pro-Europeans must also place their hopes on a fundamental change of 
the European economic regime that is to be brought about by left-of-center majorities 
in a European democracy – which seems like a very long shot. 
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Moreover, any attempt to mobilize European voters for a left-of-center program would be 
handicapped by the conditions analyzed in the preceding section. The Monetary Union 
and its defense have created massive problems for which there simply are no “good” so-
lutions. Even proposals for a Keynesian reflation and a “European Marshall Plan”, which 
a left-of-center campaign would be most likely to promote, are associated with so many 
risks and counterproductive side effects that it could hardly inspire the confidence of 
critical publics and the enthusiasm of the masses. In any case, however, once electoral 
politics would begin to address the euro crises and their resolution, they would also focus 
on the moral, legal, and economic issues of intra-European redistribution. 
The moral demand is, of course, that the peoples of Europe should be ready to practice 
the “solidarity among strangers” that ought to arise in a political community under a 
common government and a common constitution (Habermas 2011). And there is in-
deed evidence that Europeans have come to accept the inclusion of European migrants 
in the redistributive social support systems of their own state (Gerhards/Lengfeld 2013). 
But the solidarity required in the euro crisis would of course demand much more. In 
fact, it might well have to resemble the West–East transfers after German unification 
which, for the period between 1990 and 2010, were estimated at about two trillion euros 
(Süddeutsche Zeitung 2012). In that case, however, the moral obligation of solidarity 
was not itself in dispute. And by and large, the transfers could be realized by incorporat-
ing East Germany into the existing federal and welfare-state regime of West Germany. 
Thus East Germans were simply included in the national pay-as-you-go social insur-
ance system, where contribution rates were adjusted as needed. Similarly, the “new Län-
der” became part of the horizontal and vertical equalization scheme of German fiscal 
federalism, in which, after the usual haggling, contributions and benefits were modified 
to reflect the new relativities of fiscal capacity. Moreover, an existing income-tax sur-
charge was increased and earmarked for additional transfers from the federal budget. In 
other words, West-East redistribution could be – and largely was – treated as “business 
as usual” in German politics. 
In Europe, however, there are no established redistributive routines that could simply 
be activated. Nor could solidarity simply be taken for granted. It would have to ap-
peal to a European collective identity which, while increasing (Risse 2011; Gerhards/
Lengfeld 2013), seems as yet unlikely to generate the unquestioned sense of moral ob-
ligation that could be called upon in a historical nation. Hence distributive conflicts 
are unlikely to remain mute. Moreover, the moral issues of West-East redistribution 
in Germany were much simpler than those that may arise in European controversies: 
given the external indebtedness of crisis countries, for instance, would solidarity imply 
redistribution from wage-earning tax payers to capital owners and banks in the creditor 
states? Or could large-scale fiscal transfers be justified as long as recipient states engaged 
in tax-rate competition or failed to collect their own taxes from the rich? And should 
obligations and benefits depend on countries’ relative performance in the eurozone, or 
on their relative wealth – in which case one could question the inclusion of Ireland and 
the exclusion of Slovakia and Estonia, or of non-euro countries, such as Romania? In 
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short, the choice of criteria – class-based, country-specific, economic, social – on who 
should contribute and who should benefit would inevitably be controversial, and so 
would the question of whether European policies should maximize economic efficiency 
and convergence or should protect the institutional and cultural diversity of European 
societies (Agamben 2013). If these issues were to become salient in European politics, it 
is unlikely that they could be resolved by consensus. 
Legitimate majority rule?
If they are to be resolved politically, therefore, the EU or the eurozone would depend 
on majority rule – which would presuppose a fundamental constitutional revolution. 
In the European polity, it is true, integration has been promoted and many issues have 
been resolved in the absence of political consensus in a non-political “supranational-
hierarchical mode” (Scharpf 2001). In this mode, the European Court of Justice and the 
Commission have effectively shaped European policy in areas which, in spite of their 
substantive significance, had low political salience (Scharpf 2010). When the European 
polity is acting in its political mode, however, its legislative procedures – described as the 
Community Method – depend on initiatives by the Commission, the agreement of na-
tional governments in the Council, and on the European Parliament. It is a cumbersome 
process in which agreement must be reached among multiple veto players. Even after the 
move to qualified-majority voting in the Council, therefore, broad consensus remains 
the rule and the politically salient and vigorously defended concerns of individual or 
small groups of member states are rarely overridden by majority votes (Häge 2013). 
Given the empirical prevalence of consensual practices and the weakness of input-orient-
ed political processes and electoral accountability at the European level, the most plausi-
ble normative concept supporting the democratic legitimacy of the multilevel European 
polity has been that of a European “demoicracy” (Nicolaidis 2004, 2013; Cheneval 2011; 
Cheneval/Schimmelfennig 2013). It locates the basis of democratic legitimacy in the 
member states whose cultural, institutional, and political diversity ought to be protected, 
rather than homogenized, by European policies. Hence the increasing externalities of na-
tional policy choices should be resolved primarily through horizontal accommodation 
and mutual recognition, rather than through harmonization or centralized direction. 
In a similar spirit, some researchers with a comparative-politics perspective have com-
pared the political system of the European Union to “consociational regimes” at the 
national level (Hix 1994; Gabel 1998; Schmidt 2002). The concept is used to explain the 
persistence of democratic government in polities with deep ethnic, linguistic, religious, 
or other politically salient cleavages that could fall apart or erupt in civil war if the vital 
interests of constituent groups were violated by hostile majorities (Lehmbruch 1967; 
28 MPIfG Discussion Paper 13/15
Lijphart 1968, 1999; Andeweg 2000). They persist because the political elites represent-
ing the several “pillars” or “Lager” have agreed to avoid majority decisions and to seek 
compromises or consensus in all matters affecting the vital interests of any one group. 
In these comparisons, the European Union appears at best as a consociational regime, 
rather than a consociational democracy (Andeweg 2000; Schmidt 2002). Nevertheless, 
the analogy seems helpful because it also suggests a scenario for a future “transition to 
democracy” of the European political system. Comparative research on the historical 
evolution of consociational regimes provides examples of both instances of disintegra-
tion or break-up as a consequence of escalating inter-group conflict and instances of 
transitions from strict veto regimes to forms of consensus democracy that may eventu-
ally even lead to legitimate majority rule (Lehmbruch 1991, 1993; Lijphart 1999). In 
the positive scenario, the practice of elite consensus helps to dissipate mutual distrust 
among the constituent groups, and the communication of the group interests and val-
ues involved in compromise solutions will increase mutual empathy, while increased 
mobility and interactions will soften exclusive group identities. Eventually, then, the 
growing political salience of common rather than divisive interest, and political com-
munications favoring the “inclusion of the other” (Habermas 1998) may make the tran-
sition to majority rule acceptable even for politically salient issues. There is reason to 
think that European citizens, at least in the core member states, among the younger 
generations and among the more educated, have already moved a considerable distance 
along this path. It was not unreasonable to hope, therefore, that EU policy making in the 
political mode would eventually progress beyond the constraints of the “Community 
Method” and of a “semi-consociational democracy” to that of a ”semi-parliamentary 
democracy” in which majority votes would be embedded in transnational public dis-
course and deliberation (Peters 2003). 
Unfortunately, however, the evolutionary transition to European democracy has now 
been interrupted by the politics of the euro crisis. It certainly has brought the peoples 
involved closer to each other. Not only the readers of the quality press, but also the con-
sumers of TV news and tabloid headlines are now paying more attention to conditions 
and actions in other euro states than one thought possible a few years ago. But even if 
the initial “blaming and shaming” frame is weakening, what national publics now learn 
about each other is not inspiring mutual trust and a focus on common rather than con-
flicting interests. And what they read about interactions at the European level resembles 
the self-interested use of asymmetrical bargaining power more than a move toward 
consensus democracy or integrative leadership. 
What matters most, however, are the dismal and deeply divisive policy options dis-
cussed above. There is at present no suggestion in political or academic discussions of 
an integrative vision that would acknowledge the common responsibility for the euro 
crisis while describing a plausible path to economic recovery and social stabilization, 
together with a fair distribution of the burdens of adjustment. Under these conditions, 
election campaigns could not promote an overriding common interest as the focus of 
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Europe-wide and pro-European political mobilization. Instead, they would have to deal 
with highly salient and inevitably divisive conflicts over who should suffer and who 
should have to pay, for what reason and how much. 
Under these conditions, attempts to politicize European elections are most likely to 
reduce the capacity for consensual political action at the European level even further 
(Bartolini 2006). And if blockades were to be overcome by prematurely resorting to ma-
jority rule, policy choices imposed by Northern electoral majorities and liberal parties 
over Southern protests, or by Southern and Eastern majorities over Northern protests, 
might indeed destroy European cohesion. 
In short, far from facilitating a breakthrough to Political Union and European democ-
racy, the euro crisis seems most likely to reinforce the present non-political euro re-
gime, combined with intergovernmental bargaining over “Keynesian patches” and so-
cial transfers. This is not an inspiring prospect. But it may be the best that is available.14
14 The outcome is, of course, not pre-ordained: in the best of all possible worlds, supply-side 
conditionalities might help to improve the competitiveness of GIIPS economies, while social 
misery would be mitigated by external transfers. But things might also go from bad to worse 
if the availability of transfers were to prevent gains in competitiveness and economic recovery 
while mass unemployment were to perpetuate the need for transfers. 
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